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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of current research and practice of governance evaluation 
covering three topics: electoral accountability, corruption, and multidimensional peacekeep-
ing. It illustrates how previous evaluation challenges have been tackled using state-of-the-art 
methodologies, and how these methods are recently being used to explore causal mechanisms. 
This paper argues that evaluating interventions is necessary in order to advance our 
knowledge of governance, but that studies that test theories and assumptions, explain causes 
and consequences, and tackle measurement problems are equally important, especially for do-
nor programming. By reviewing a range of ongoing and published evaluation and research 
studies, this paper extracts lessons for governance policy and for practice of governance eval-
uation. 
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1 Introduction 
Governance is widely considered to be crucial for development. However, election 
irregularities such as ballot fraud, violence and vote-buying plague new democracies, 
instances of corruption in public sectors occur almost daily, and the incidence of civil war 
and conflicts continues to afflict the poorest countries.  
A broad spectrum of development actors is interested in promoting ‘good governance’. 
Many multilateral and bilateral agencies send international observers as election day 
approaches and provide democracy assistance beyond elections. For instance, between 
2001 and 2011, the Department for International Development (DFID) through United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided £ 140 million in support of education 
campaigns for voters, training for political parties and media, beyond designing electoral 
systems and improving voter registration (ICAI 2012). Many non-governmental 
organisations act as corruption watchdogs for local and global public actors. Not least, 
about 70 public sector reform projects are financed by the Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) and implemented by the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) to combat corruption in 
public administration (BMZ 2011). And lastly, several donor countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), along with the United Nations 
(UN), strongly engage in peace- and state-building efforts.  
Recently, there has been a growing awareness that evaluating the impact of governance 
support should be incorporated in donor programming. Indeed, in the past five years there 
has been a dramatic increase in impact evaluation studies in development co-operation 
more generally, partly motivated by commitments to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Fourth High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. Most of these evaluations have been conducted for 
the purpose of upward accountability and learning (Naudet / Delarue / Bernard 2012).  
However, the importance of evaluation as a learning tool has recently been subject to 
debates. This is due to the disagreement on whether impact evaluations can answer the 
why and the how questions. Even with a large number of project evaluations, it is unlikely 
to find out how, for example, the poor can escape poverty, unless the analysis provides 
evidence on why the projects work, rather than whether they work. Some researchers 
argue that answering the why and the how can be achieved by evaluating not only projects, 
but also the theoretical assumptions underlying a specific intervention (Deaton 2010 / 
Ludwig / Kling / Mullainathan 2011). 
An important distinction should be made between evaluations that aim to test theories, and 
those that aim to test the effectiveness of a project (or policy). Unfortunately, conventional 
evaluations first and foremost test the effectiveness of a project alone. But a new wave of 
evaluations, especially those conducted through experimentation, has started testing 
different theories and causal mechanisms that underlie a project (for instance, Duflo / 
Hanna / Ryan 2010; Giné / Karlan / Zinman 2010). In this approach, the implicit theory of 
change is further questioned.  
In this paper, evaluation studies refer to those that examine the impact of a deliberate 
“intervention”, whereas research studies go beyond that – for instance testing causalities, 
such as the impact of violence on political participation; confirming theories from 
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economic and behavioural sciences; or improving techniques and measurement. The 
difference between evaluations and research studies could be gradual: micro research 
studies can still be evaluations. But rather than focusing on “no intervention” as a 
counterfactual, it explores a different intervention, testing a different theory of change. 
This paper, therefore, examines the potential of utilising both types of studies to enhance 
our understanding of complex governance issues.  
Despite the importance of qualitative work and country analysis, this paper will 
exclusively focus on a subset of evaluation and research studies that make use of 
experimental and quasi-experimental designs at the micro-level. By focusing at the micro-
level, this paper should complement and support countrywide and cross-country 
governance studies (see for example, Grävingholt / Leininger / von Haldenwang 2012; 
Hickson 2010; NORAD 2011). 
This paper presents an overview of evaluation and research studies on electoral 
accountability, corruption and multidimensional peacekeeping. 50 evaluation and micro 
research studies (14 on corruption, 18 on elections and 18 on peacekeeping) have been 
selected and examined based on information provided at donor websites1, presentations 
from conferences, as well as recent reviews of the academic literature2.   
This paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the quantitative methods that are 
commonly used for impact evaluations. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present the evaluation and 
micro research studies on electoral accountability, corruption and multidimensional peace-
building, respectively. In each chapter, results from several evaluations are compiled to 
give a general overview of whether specific interventions work. Several examples of 
micro research studies complement the evaluations. On electoral accountability, this paper 
provides examples on causal linkage (clientelism and voter turnout) and measurement. On 
corruption, the analysis will focus on whether it exists and its channels; while on 
peacekeeping, the paper will examine the consequences of civil wars and conflict. Chapter 
6 discusses general lessons and implications for donors. Chapter 7 discusses how research 
studies that complement evaluations can be systematically integrated into donor 
programming for the purpose of informing policy. Chapter 8 presents the conclusions.  
   
                                                 
1  The following websites of  donor agencies and web portals have been consulted (May 2011): UK DFID, 
ITAD, USAID, World Bank PREM, World Bank DIME, European Commission, 3ie, BMZ, DANIDA, 
OECD DAC, CIDA/GESP, AUSAID, SIDA, MCC’s Threshold Program, GOVNET, UNIFEM, Demo-
cratic Governance Support Program, EGAP, JPAL and GSDRC.  
2  Note, however, that some donors, such as the UK DFID, have channeled their support on impact 
evaluation through 3ie or the World Bank’s SIEF.  Thus, the source where the information was gathered 
does not necessarily reflect that the evaluation is initiated by a single organisation. Many of the 
academic papers published on this topic originated from projects commissioned or supported by donors.  
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2 Impact evaluation 
2.1 Definition 
Impact evaluation analyses the impact of an intervention on welfare outcomes. 
Interventions may take the form of policies, programmes or projects. In reality, changes in 
outcome may be only partly due to the intervention, and sometimes not at all. Thus, the 
fundamental problem with evaluation is how to establish attribution, i.e. to determine that 
the outcome is the result of the intervention and not of any other factors. It raises the issue 
of the counterfactual, “the comparison of what actually happened and what would have 
happened in the absence of intervention”(White 2006).  
Formally, impact is the difference in outcome Y, with Y1 denoting the outcome if a person 
is exposed to the intervention, and Y0 is the outcome if he/she is not.  
      (1) 
At any given point in time, it is only possible to observe the outcome when the person is 
exposed to treatment, but not the outcome when not exposed. In other words, the 
impossibility to observe both states at the same time poses a dilemma for Equation 1.  
To resolve this dilemma, researchers compare the outcome “before-and-after” or find a 
comparison group that did not receive the intervention. However, changes in outcome 
before-and-after rarely represent the effect of the intervention, as many events or 
developments can occur in between those points that can inflate or deflate the real impact. 
Examples include disasters, weather conditions and national information campaigns. 
Further, data from a programme with a comparison group that allows a “with-versus-
without” comparison can also give biased results if the reasons for participating in the 
programme are due to many factors, both observed and unobserved. To give an example, 
if at the outset the treatment group is more motivated than the comparison group, then the 
increase in impact is probably not (completely) caused by  the treatment, but rather by the 
fact that the treatment group is better at the start (this is often called selection bias). 
2.2 Methods 
Researchers have developed several techniques to overcome the problems associated with 
the before-and-after and with-versus-without comparisons mentioned above. This is done 
by searching for a valid counterfactual or a “what would have happened without the 
intervention” situation.  
An increasingly popular method in evaluation research is a randomised experiment where 
individuals are randomly assigned to the project. This concept is in fact not new. Doctors 
conduct randomised trials most times when they test the efficacy of new drugs, where they 
randomly assign patients into either the test or placebo group. Randomly assigning 
generates two groups of participants, the treatment and the control group. As the size of 
the treatment and control groups increase, the difference between the two groups in terms 
of extraneous factors should even out and the only remaining difference should be the 
intervention. Thus, impact is calculated by comparing the averages of those who received 
treatment and those who did not.  
01 YYimpact −=
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Randomised trials may not be suitable in cases where projects are aimed to reach specific 
groups. Ethical, political and logistical considerations can also make random allocation 
inappropriate. In these cases, a range of quasi-experiments resembling an experimental 
situation is an alternative. Quasi-experiments ensure that the participants who took part in 
the programme are, in terms of their characteristics, as close as possible to those who did 
not. The procedures ensure that the selection bias is addressed in the analysis. However, 
quasi-experiments often require a large number of observations to achieve robust results, 
as well as assumptions regarding the nature of the data that may not be directly testable. 
Nevertheless, if designed properly, many researchers have successfully applied quasi-
experiments in teasing out the impact of a policy intervention. Garcia (2011) provides a 
more comprehensive explanation of micro-approaches in evaluating governance 
interventions. See Box 1 for a summary of experimental and quasi-experimental designs. 
Box 1: Impact evaluation techniques 
Impact is calculated as the difference in outcome with and without an intervention. But since it is not 
possible to collect data from a single individual or subject in both circumstances – in the presence and 
absence of intervention – various techniques can be applied to circumvent the problem of missing data, 
and to arrive at an unbiased estimate of the impact. The application of these techniques largely depends 
on how the intervention has been or will be implemented, and on the design of the experiment in general.  
Randomisation (Randomised control trial - RCT): This approach requires that participants be 
randomly assigned to treatment. The random assignment generates two groups of participants, the control 
group and the treatment group. As the number of sample participants increases, the difference between the 
two groups in terms of extraneous factors should even out, until the only remaining difference is the 
intervention.  
Instrumental variable (IV): In simple terms, this approach involves identifying a special variable that 
affects outcome and intervention, but without the two having any causality. An IV approach is called for 
if the causal relationship between intervention and outcome runs in the opposite direction. Such a scenario 
occurs when (i) the intervention has been deliberately targeted or (ii) participants have joined the 
programme for specific reasons. This implies that potentially unobserved characteristics or omitted 
variables have not been taken into account.  
Difference-in-differences (DID): This approach calculates impact by utilising information before and 
after the intervention and calculating the change in outcome over the two periods separately for the 
control and treatment groups. Changes experienced by both groups are then compared in order to identify 
the “real” effect of the intervention.  
Propensity score matching (PSM): To minimise confounding factors due to the non-random assignment 
of the intervention, matching requires finding a comparison group that matches the characteristics of the 
treatment group. The observable characteristics are used to generate a propensity score, which is the 
probability of participation. Each treated individual is matched to a non-participant on the basis of this 
propensity score.  
Regression discontinuity design (RDD): RDD require a specific eligibility rule (for instance, an income 
threshold) when targeting participants for the programme. The degree to which the intervention changes 
the outcome forthe treatment group compared to non-participants near the eligibility cut-off is the impact.  
Natural experiments: The treatment assignment is one that is controlled not by evaluators, but by a 
natural phenomenon or by the occurrence of an event. Similar to other approaches, assignment will 
generate two groups of participants – the treatment group that is affected by nature or the event, and the 
control group that is not. 
Source:  Garcia (2011) 
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2.3 Impact evaluation in development cooperation 
Driven by results and motivated by commitments to the MDGs, the Paris Declaration and 
the Accra Agenda for Action, many donors are now increasingly undertaking rigorous 
impact evaluation of development programmes. In traditional sectors, such as health, 
education and labour, a strong body of evidence has been produced in recent years, 
measuring the impact of a wide range of interventions, and evaluations in governance have 
been steadily increasing in number. 
Apart from the gains in efficiency to be obtained from allocating scarce resources to 
interventions that work, conducting rigorous impact evaluation in governance is very 
important, given the unintended, yet potentially damaging consequences of an 
inappropriate governance intervention. Development co-operation in such fields as 
democracy, transparency and human rights is too important, to base our knowledge purely 
on anecdotal evidence. Proponents believe that, by understanding the impact of a specific 
intervention – what works and why – the elusive macroeconomic effects of development 
assistance can eventually be identified. 
There is, however, scepticism about the ability of impact evaluations to address the why 
and how questions. Even with a large number of project evaluations, it might still be 
doubtful that they would deliver generalisable results. In his article in the Journal of 
Economic Literature, Deaton (2010) made a case in favour of experimenting with theories 
rather than projects: “RCTs, even when done without error or contamination, are unlikely 
to be helpful for policy, or to move beyond the local, unless they tell us something about 
why the program worked, something to which they are often neither targeted nor well-
suited.” Beyond RCTs, this observation applies to the entire debate on impact evaluation. 
Regardless whether the method applied is RCT or quasi-experimental, it is important to 
not only examine interventions, but also the theoretical assumptions built into them. This 
would help shed light on many questions pertaining to why and under what conditions the 
intervention works.  
But up to what extent should the evaluation of projects shift towards the evaluation of 
theories? Following some suggestions from Ludwig / Kling / Mullainathan (2011), 
evaluation of theories and assumptions underlying the intervention can be beneficial if: 
information to support planning, implementation and improvement of future programmes 
are needed more than information for auditing purposes;  
if programme managers are less certain, which programmes or policies would suit best and 
would like to rule out potentially ill-suiting programmes; and  
if they are keen to validate and strengthen the causal mechanism behind the intervention. 
In many cases, evaluation is seen more as an accountability rather than as a learning tool 
(Jones et al 2009; Naudet / Delarue / Bernard 2012). But without knowing why 
interventions work, donors cannot take appropriate corrective action. Eventually, a 
delicate balance between these two objectives must be established, and donors have to 
decide on the spectrum within which they identify themselves. 
Table 1 presents the properties of studies considered in this paper against the vast 
literature on evaluation and causal research. This paper will provide an overview and will 
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focus only on a subset of evaluation and research work, notwithstanding the importance of 
other qualitative and countrywide studies. Both evaluation and micro empirical research 
presented here aimed at informing policy-making using experimental and quasi-
experimental methods. The studies considered require large observations at the micro-
level of individuals, communities and villages.  
Where the two fields of study in this paper differ is in the object of analysis. Evaluation 
studies analyse the impact of a deliberate “intervention”, whereas micro research studies 
pertain to general causalities (the study of the impact of violence on political 
participation), root causes (why rebellion exists), testing new theories and developing new 
measures (capturing clientelism). But note that the distinction between the novel approach 
to evaluation and causal micro research is very slight.  
Table 1:  Properties of evaluation and research studies defined in this paper 
Topic Evaluation Studies Empirical Micro Research 
Conventional Approach Novel Approach 
Main purpose To inform policy To inform policy and 
contribute to building 
knowledge 
To inform policy and 
contribute to building 
knowledge 
Relevance Validating the 
effectiveness of an 
intervention 
Validate assumptions 
about a given 
intervention, in addition 
to validating its 
effectiveness 
Establish causes and 
consequences, test theories and 
assumptions, and improve 
measurement 
Object of 
analysis 
Intervention  Intervention 
Mechanism between 
intervention I and 
outcome Y  
Multiple intervention 
arm/ Different 
intervention as 
counterfactual 
Causal relationship between 
independent variable X and 
outcome Y.  
Mechanism behind 
independent variable X and 
outcome Y 
Types of 
questions 
addressed 
What type of 
interventions work? 
Which ones do not?  
Why does intervention I 
work? Under what 
circumstances does the 
intervention work?  
What are the causes and 
consequences of Y? What is 
the mechanism behind the 
relationship? 
Methods Randomised control 
trials 
Quasi-experimental 
design 
Randomised control 
trials 
Quasi-experimental 
design 
Randomised control trials  
Quasi-experimental design 
Type of data  Large n Large n Large n 
Level of 
analysis 
Micro Micro Micro 
Main recipients Donors, Governments Donors, Governments, 
Academia 
Donors, Governments, 
Academia 
Source: Authors’s representation 
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The next three chapters will present new evidence and current donor initiatives on 
electoral accountability, corruption and multidimensional peacekeeping. The lessons 
learned from donor interventions are discussed in the first part of each chapter as 
evaluation studies and in the second part, micro empirical studies are presented to further 
our understanding of the issues. The complementarities of both fields of study will also be 
discussed.  
3 Electoral accountability 
Voter behaviour continues to be one of the most controversial issues in comparative 
politics. In many established democracies, a significant proportion of citizens does not 
vote and absenteeism is on the rise, particularly among the poorer sectors of society 
(Niemi / Weisberg 2001). There are a multitude of factors that have been documented to 
explain voter behaviour, ranging from the voters’ rational choice, their asymmetric 
information, the transaction costs of voting, competition between candidates, to political 
conditions and the voters’ socio-economic characteristics (Aldrich 1993; Ashenfelter / 
Kelley 1975; Cebula / Meads 2007; Edlin / Gelman / Kaplan 2007; Fowler 2006).  
In the context of developing economies, the decision to vote and the reasons for variations 
across countries become very different given that elections are marred by violence, ballot 
fraud and clientelism. Election irregularities distort the process of accountability and 
undermine the democratic process. Vote-buying reverses the role of voters and politicians: 
It is the politicians who hold the voters accountable for their vote in exchange for material 
benefits (Stokes 2005). Candidates who are able to resort to ballot fraud can hardly be 
made responsible for their performance. Violence and intimidation cause citizens to shun 
running for office or to refrain from voting.   
The way in which elections are conducted and held reflects the level of democratic 
consolidation. In the principal-agent models of democratic delegation, the voter (as 
principal) has the ultimate power to elect holders of public office (as agents), entrusting 
them with the task of delivering public services, and holding them accountable for their 
actions. Thus, elections should be considered a key element of political accountability. 
Numerous strategies and policy reforms on a global scale have been pursued to promote 
electoral accountability. One of the main challenges in evaluating the effects of these 
interventions is attribution. Suppose we want to study the effect of a voter education 
campaign. One cannot say for certain that the change in outcome is due to the campaign, 
rather than to other factors. The individual heterogeneity stemming from the beneficiaries 
self-selection to the programme can only be captured if the education campaign is 
randomly allocated. (Random allocation of treatment is not the same as random sampling 
in surveys.) 
The second main challenge is observational equivalence. Consider for example studies 
that explore the role of institutions, both formal and informal, on electoral accountability. 
Although descriptive and national statistics may suggest that institutions play a role with 
regard to electoral accountability, such evidence cannot demonstrate a causal relationship. 
Institutions may be the cause, but they can also be the product of electoral accountability.   
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The third main challenge is measurement error. Electoral abnormalities are difficult to 
establish as a result of underreporting. For instance, respondents tend not to report their 
participation in vote-buying, since it is illegal in many countries (De La O 2011) and 
socially objectionable (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2010). Similarly, electoral intimidation 
and violence are quite sensitive and threatening in nature, so that voters may opt for 
secrecy and anonymity, rather than divulging their experience. Hence, vote-buying and 
related electoral problems cannot be accurately captured due to poor measurement.  
Confronted by these challenges and by the need to improve our understanding of not only 
what works but also why and how, a new generation of studies in evaluation and research 
focus on causal explanations, innovative measures and causal mechanisms. Section 3.1 
provides lessons learned from evaluations promoting electoral accountability. Section 3.2 
provides examples of mechanism studies that explain the causal relationship between 
clientelism and voter turnout.    
3.1 Evaluation studies 
This study identifies three broad types of election strategies, with outcomes that can affect 
the behaviour of voters or politicians and the results of elections. More concretely, the 
interventions identified are election monitoring, social cash transfers and civic education 
campaigns. These interventions aim to change the behaviour of both politicians and voters 
by persuading voters to refrain from selling their votes and discouraging politicians from 
buying votes. These interventions may also have an impact on electoral outcomes, either 
directly or indirectly. Table 2 provides a list of evaluation studies using quantitative 
techniques. 
Election monitoring 
One of the internationally recognised strategies to promote electoral accountability is the 
deployment of international observers during election periods. Despite the intrusiveness of 
this intervention and the seemingly irrational behaviour of nondemocratic incumbents, 
invitations to international observers have increased considerably over the past decade, 
almost becoming an “international norm”. Hyde (2011) argues that the “decision to invite 
observers is closely tied to the availability of international benefits for countries perceived 
as democracies”(ibid., 209). 
Cross-country statistics on elections held between 1990 and 2006 suggest that incumbent 
leaders are more likely to lose an election if international observers are present (Hyde 
2011). Although the statistics are suggestive, the challenge to establish the presence of 
international observers as first order cause relies on the assumption that there are no pre-
existing differences between those incumbent leaders who invite observers and those who 
do not.  
Recognising this challenge, Hyde (2007; 2010; 2011) took advantage of a natural 
experiment in Armenia and conducted a field experiment in Indonesia to assess the impact 
of international observers on election outcomes. By comparing two different election 
environments – Armenia’s overt Election Day fraud in 2003 and Indonesia’s relatively 
democratic presidential election in 2004 – she found that election monitoring reduces the 
Innovations in governance 
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share of the vote of the fraudulent candidate (Armenia’s incumbent government). In 
contrast, the Indonesian incumbent not accused of fraud increased his share of the votes, 
albeit still losing the election. Hyde argues that international observers made it difficult 
and costly to steal elections in Armenia and that polling officials in Indonesia tended to 
follow election regulations more strictly when being watched. 
Another type of election monitoring strategy that appears to have a significant effect on 
election outcome is the use of technology. Callen / Long (2011) tested the effectiveness of 
digital cameras in the 2010 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. Randomly selected 
polling stations received a letter informing them that posted results will be photographed 
and compared to the official vote count at headquarters. The researchers’ aim was to 
compare reports from stations that were warned of the election audit with stations that 
received no warning. They found a 25 percent reduction in votes for fraudulent candidates 
and 60 percent reduction in stolen election materials. The increased transparency through 
the use of technology constrained government or polling officials from manipulating votes 
on behalf of the candidates through vote-selling or improper counting of votes.  
Social cash transfers 
In countries where vote-buying is rampant, social benefits may be allocated at the 
discretion of the ruling party as part of their campaign strategy. Beneficiaries are targeted 
based on a combination of observable and unobservable factors that leave a lot of room for 
political manipulation. Before 1997, the Mexican regime is an example where “social 
programs were designed to grant ample discretion to the government, which in turn used 
social transfers to reward partisan supporter and mobilize voters in elections” (Diaz-
Cayeros / Estevez / Magaloni 2009).  
The creation of the Mexican conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme called Programa 
de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) (now Oportunidades) in 1997 has 
reduced the discretionary powers of political leaders3. First, the eligibility to enrol in the 
programme is based on objective criteria such as poverty indices, demography and socio-
economic indicators. Second, once beneficiaries are enrolled, they cannot be withdrawn if 
they fulfil the required set of conditions – investments in health, education and nutrition. 
Finally, the benefits are randomly assigned.   
The challenge in analysing the effect of vote-buying on individual voting behaviour is 
identifying what is cause and what is effect. People vote for the politicians because of the 
social benefits, but it can also be that politicians allocate the benefits because the people 
voted for them. The random assignment of programme benefits and the overall set-up of 
the Mexican Progresa programme allow researchers to address the challenge of causal 
inference.  
 
                                                 
3  For more information, see Levy (2006).  
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Table 2: Election interventions 
Title Intervention Country Status Method Author/Source/
Donor 
The pseudo-democrat’s 
dilemma 
International 
observers 
Indonesia/ 
Armenia 
completed Natural 
expt’l/ 
RCT 
Hyde (2011) 
Institutional corruption and 
election fraud: Evidence from 
a field experiment in 
Afghanistan 
Digital 
camera/ 
election 
monitoring 
Afghanis-
tan 
completed RCT Callen and 
Long (2011) 
Do informed voters make 
better choices? Experimental 
evidence from urban India 
Information 
campaign  
India completed  RCT Banerjee et al. 
(2010) 
Do conditional cash transfers 
affect electoral behaviour? 
Evidence from a Randomized 
Control Trial in Mexico 
CCT Mexico completed RCT De la O (2008)  
Essays on the political 
economy of fiscal policy in 
developing countries 
CCT Mexico completed RDD Green (2006) 
Welfare benefits, canvassing, 
and campaign handouts 
CCT Mexico completed PSM Diaz-Cayeros / 
Estevez / Maga- 
loni  (2009) 
Can voters be primed to 
choose better legislators?  
Evidence from two field 
experiments in rural India 
Campaign 
strategies 
India completed  RCT Banerjee et al. 
(2010) 
Is information power? 
Using cell phones during an 
Election in Mozambique 
Voter 
education 
and  mobile 
phone  
hotline 
Mozam-
bique 
completed RCT and 
DID 
Aker / Collier / 
Vicente (2011) 
Votes and violence:  
Experimental evidence from 
a Nigerian election 
Anti-
violence 
grassroots 
campaign 
Nigeria completed  RCT Collier / Vicente 
(2010)  
Information dissemination 
and local governments’ 
electoral returns: Evidence 
from a field experiment in 
Mexico 
Information 
campaign  
Mexico completed RCT Chong et al. 
(2010) / JPAL 
Exposing corrupt politicians: 
The effects of Brazil's 
publicly released audits on 
electoral outcomes 
Information 
campaign  
Brazil completed  RCT Ferraz / Finan 
(2008) 
Can informed public 
deliberation overcome 
clientelism? Experimental 
evidence from Benin 
Campaign 
strategies 
 
Benin 
 
completed  RCT Wantchekon 
(2009) 
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In the context of the 2000 and 2006 Mexican elections, the effect of CCT on voting 
behaviour was mixed. Utilising the randomisation component of Programa de Educatión, 
Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) and the delay in programme roll out in the localities, 
De la O (2008) finds that CCT has led to a significant increase in turnout and share of the 
votes for incumbent leaders in the 2000 presidential election. In contrast, using the 
regression discontinuity approach and different area coverage, Green (2006) finds that 
PROGRESA has no impact on voter turnout and has no effect on helping the incumbent to 
win. Using national exit poll data and propensity score matching to analyse voting 
behaviour in the 2006 presidential election, Diaz-Cayeros / Estevez / Magaloni (2009) find 
that programme beneficiaries, who would otherwise vote for the opposition, voted for the 
incumbent because of the CCT programme.  
Although the three studies have used the appropriate methods to address the problem of 
causality, the results presented above are not robust, owing to differences in selection 
strategy and how the treatment variable is operationalised. One can also argue that the 
experimental set-up is superior to quasi-randomisation. Although this paper does not 
favour one method over another, there is notable merit in applying randomised trials over 
quasi-experiments, but they also suffer from several practical problems4. Nevertheless, 
more studies regarding the impact of social transfers on voting behaviour are expected to 
be published in the near future, given the programmes currently implemented in many 
developing countries. This will hopefully shed more light on these conflicting results.  
Information and civic education campaigns 
Anti-vote-buying campaigns through civic education are by far the most widespread 
strategy that seeks to change the incentives of voters to participate in elections. The idea is 
that an informed electorate enhances political accountability. However, surveys and 
anecdotal evidence show that campaigns are ineffective in reducing vote-buying in the 
Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan, and have sometimes even encouraged the very 
behaviour they were supposed to eradicate (Schaffer 2007).  
                                                 
4  However, such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See Deaton (2010) and Humphreys / 
Weinstein (2009) for more detailed discussion regarding this debate. 
continue table 2: Election interventions 
Clientelism and voting 
behaviour: Evidence from a 
field experiment in Benin 
Campaign 
strategies 
Benin Completed RCT Wantchekon 
(2003) 
An impact evaluation of 
information disclosure on 
elected representatives’ 
performance: Evidence from 
rural and urban India 
Information 
campaign 
India ongoing  RCT Pande et al. / 
3ie 
(2012) 
The right to vote right: 
Testing voter education 
campaigns in India 
Voter 
education  
India ongoing RCT IDEA/USAID 
(2012) 
Source:  Author’s representation 
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Although such studies have greatly increased our understanding of vote-buying, surveys 
and anecdotal evidence is limited by its inability to capture attribution – that the change in 
voter behaviour is due to the civic education campaign and not to individual 
socioeconomic characteristics or to some unobservable criteria correlated with their voting 
choices. The use of experiments and quasi-experiments paved the way to solving this 
issue.   
Evaluation studies suggest that civic education campaigns can be effective in improving 
voter turnout and vote share of incumbents, but the effect can vary depending on the 
campaign message. Banerjee et al. (2010) conducted a door-to-door campaign to randomly 
selected slum dwellers in India, as well as a newspaper campaign that contained 
information about incumbents’ performance. Their study shows that information increases 
voter turnout and increases the vote share of incumbents who devote more funds to the 
slums and attended committee meetings. In a similar vein, Aker / Collier / Vicente (2011) 
found in Mozambique that the door-to-door distribution of information about voting, 
newspaper coverage containing election messages and the creation of an electoral hotline 
are all successful in increasing voter turnout. Anti-violence grassroots campaigns can also 
have a positive impact on improving turnout. In Nigeria, Collier / Vicente (2010) showed 
that town meetings, street theatres and the distribution of campaign materials helped 
combat voter intimidation and consequently increased voter turnout by decreasing 
perceived threats to individual voters.       
However, the evidence suggests that the content of the campaign messages can also have 
an effect on turnout and vote share. Chong et al. (2010) found that information distributed 
via flyers about ‘excessive corruption’ reduced voter  participation and vote share of 
incumbents in Mexico. Similarly, Ferraz / Finan (2008) report on the effects of media 
exposure of corrupt politicians in Brazil and found that citizens used the information when 
voting – the incumbent’s likelihood to be re-elected was reduced when reports of 
corruption associated with the municipalities were disclosed. In addition, an election 
mobilisation campaign that “primed voters to not to vote on ethnic lines” increased voter 
turnout, specially with men, but not campaigns that urged “voters to not vote for corrupt 
politicians” (Banerjee et al. 2010, 3). Wantchekon’s (2009) preliminary findings in the 
2006 Benin election suggest that campaign strategies based on “informed empirical 
research” (rather than clientelistic messages) have a positive effect on turnout and 
electoral support. Wantchekon (2003) investigated the effect of a clientelistic versus a 
“broad, nationally-oriented” message to randomly selected villages during the 2001 Benin 
election. His experiment showed that clientelism increased voting probability for regional 
and incumbent candidates, but was less popular for women, who were more attracted to 
the public-policy type of campaigning.  
Two further impact evaluation studies regarding the effect of information disclosure and 
voter education on voter turnout and political participation are currently being carried out 
by JPAL and 3ie in Mexico and India, respectively.  
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The evaluation studies are motivated by addressing different views that explain electoral 
accountability. Some of these are: institutions, development and information (Pande 
2012). Institutions and political systems affect vote-buying through poor legislation, 
inadequate monitoring, weak parties and elite capture (Hicken 2011). The level of 
development influences vote-buying because poorer voters are more vulnerable to offers 
of a material nature than richer voters (Brusco / Nazareno / Stokes 2004). Information 
allows voters to make informed decisions about politicians and to make them accountable 
during elections. Of the three views, the bulk of empirical work identified in this study has 
focused on the impact of information through voter education campaigns.  
This section has uncovered two important implications for electoral accountability. First, 
more rigorous evidence is needed in terms of understanding the influence of institutions 
on political accountability. One of the reasons behind the lack of evidence is the difficulty 
of evaluating institutional or developmental reforms using the methods mentioned above. 
Institutional reforms, such as passing new legislation or establishing an autonomous 
election commission, often cover the entire population, where the possibility of collecting 
control group data is quite limited.   
Second, most research on electoral accountability identified in this study has explored the 
role of information and civic information campaigns. However, greater validity of the 
results can only be accomplished through replication and longer-term evaluations. Civic 
education may have an impact on voter turnout and election outcomes today, but it is still 
unclear whether it would eventually weed out bad politicians or improve public policy in 
the long run. Analysing long-term impacts is clearly an important area for future research. 
3.2 Empirical micro research 
Evaluation studies are often based on implicit assumptions regarding the causal 
relationships between specific actions or institutions on the one hand, and voter behaviour 
or electoral outcomes, on the other. The assumptions tend to reflect the conceptual 
groundwork of the interventions under review. This groundwork, however, is often far 
from being empirically tested.  
In our example, the evaluation studies implicitly assume that vote-buying, clientelism, 
ballot fraud and violence influence electoral behaviour. Although cross-country studies 
and qualitative work provided important insights regarding the causal relationship between 
these factors, the (negative or positive) relationship is still far from established.  
Box 2: Impacts on voter participation and electoral outcomes 
Intervention Voter participation Electoral support 
International observers positive negative for fraudulent candidate 
Digital cameras  reduced vote count for fraudulent 
candidate 
Social cash transfer mixed mixed 
Civic information campaigns generally positive, but depends on 
campaign message 
depends on campaign message 
Source:  Author’s representation 
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Specifically, consider the relationship between clientelism and voter turnout. The main 
challenge in analysing this relationship is again observational equivalence: Citizens vote 
because they received a gift or they receive the gift because they voted. Identifying the 
initial mover is very important, but quite problematic given repeated interactions in a 
clientelist environment. Experiments and quasi-experimental designs can help solve this 
issue by controlling for treatment assignment. It ensures that the citizens who received the 
gifts have more or less similar characteristics as those who did not. 
In this example, instead of testing a specific intervention that fosters electoral account-
ability, we could test an assumption – that clientelism affects voting behaviour. Another 
idea is testing various hypotheses on why such causation exists. Consider two competing 
hypotheses regarding clientelism and voter turnout. On the one hand, clientelism increases 
voter turnout if the clientelist parties are powerful enough to convince not only their core 
supporters, but also swing voters to vote; if the citizens know that the parties can monitor 
their compliance; and if it encourages poor voters to participate in elections since it 
reflects the parties’ concern for the poor. On the other hand, clientelism decreases voter 
turnout if voters who receive clientelist gifts will opt not to vote as a sign of defection; and 
if voters feel disillusioned about the political system and therefore prefer not to vote. 
Hence clientelism can have both positive and negative effects on voter turnout.  
Testing theories 
To test the assumption that vote-buying is a strategy that signals the parties’ concern for 
the poor (see above in italics), Kramon (2011) employed an experimental design in Kenya. 
He assigned individuals into vote-buying condition and control group. Individuals in both 
groups were asked to listen to a typical radio discussion about a campaign event held by a 
candidate. The only difference between them was that the vote-buying group heard a 10 
second discussion about the 100 Kenyan shillings given out to those who attended the 
campaign event. He then asked questions about the likelihood of supporting the 
hypothetical candidate and grouped them according to the socio-economic status of the 
respondents. His initial results show that vote-buying is particularly effective with the 
poorer voters “because it conveys information about the future provision of small private 
goods and patronage. In short, vote buying builds a politician’s credibility as a patron for 
the poor and can therefore be effective despite ballot secrecy” (ibid., 25). His results also 
rejected the theoretical assumption that vote-buying signifies candidates’ competence and 
that they can ultimately provide better public goods and services. 
Measurement 
To provide an explanation for the clientelism-turnout causality, one has to first address the 
issue of measurement. As mentioned earlier, clientelism and vote-buying is difficult to 
measure because it is generally underreported. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2010) aimed to 
unravel this measurement problem with an experiment in Nicaragua5. Instead of using 
traditional surveys where respondents were directly asked whether they had received any 
                                                 
5  In this context, I consider vote-buying as a subset of clientelism following Hicken (2011), and have used 
the term interchangeably. The experiment by Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2010) focused only on the 
concept of vote-buying. 
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benefits – gifts or money – in exchange for votes, respondents were shown a card with 
response options and asked to indicate how many activities were carried out by the 
candidates, rather than telling which ones. This method is called a list experiment. Like all 
experiments, the survey sample is randomly split into treatment and control groups. The 
respondents in the treatment group were given an additional response category, which was 
whether the candidate had given the respondent a gift or did him/her a favour. The 
difference in the average responses of the two groups is the reported vote-buying activity. 
Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. found that vote-buying activities are underreported because 
respondents shy away from revealing illegal behaviour, and that empirical work should 
take this non-random measurement error into account. Hence, experimentation has helped 
to confirm the suspicion that vote-buying is underreported. To uncover the channel on 
which vote-buying operates, they have tested the monitoring and compliance hypothesis 
as mentioned above. They find that parties tend to target people they can monitor or 
people whom they believe they can convince that their vote can be monitored. This 
confirms that the channel from which vote-buying operates is related to the monitoring 
ability of parties.  
Testing causality 
Moving away from clientelism, consider another example regarding the effect of violence 
on political participation. Here, instead of evaluating anti-violence campaigns, the study 
evaluates the impact of violence on political participation using natural experiments. The 
results are unexpected: While violence can be a factor that hinders the populace to vote, 
such a traumatic experience can also be the driving force for participating in elections and 
running for office. Exploiting the near exogenous variation in rebel recruitment, Blattman 
(2009) found that victims of violence have a higher probability of participating in 
elections and becoming candidates, possibly due to the mobilising impact of political 
violence. This finding pointed out that psychological factors may be associated with 
political participation. Such a finding is especially useful when designing donor inter-
ventions. The intervention should not only be based on a general context, but also on 
personal experience and the characteristics of the target population.  
These examples convey two broad messages: First, testing whether the assumptions hold 
or not, and ruling out alternative channels of impact, can significantly help in under-
standing why and how the intervention works. Second, studies that focus on appropriately 
measuring difficult-to-measure governance phenomena are very important in verifying 
claims that have potential ramifications on the applicability of certain donor programmes. 
These examples are merely subset of many studies in the literature on clientelism and 
other election irregularities. What is important to stress is that experimentation and 
rigorous quantitative analysis can help provide compelling evidence to explain the origins 
of the causality.  
4 Corruption 
Corruption is generally defined as the abuse of public office for private gains (Bardhan 
1997; Shleifer / Vishny 1993; Svensson 2005). Corruption diverts resources from their 
productive use, consequently affecting innocent lives. It results in a lower provision of 
public goods, particularly to the poor and most affected, while filling the pockets of the 
Melody Garcia 
16 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
few (Eigen 2005). There is much fertile soil for corruption, and thus the potential costs to 
development are high (Klitgaard 1991; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Shleifer / Vishny 1993).  
Some field experiments and quantitative studies attest to this: For example, Dal Bó and 
Rossi (2007) find that corrupt countries in Latin America are associated with inefficient 
firms, requiring more labour than necessary for a given level of output. A field experiment 
in India suggests that while corruption speeds up the application process for drivers’ 
licences, it also allows for unqualified individuals to obtain a license, which can be 
socially harmful (Bertrand et al 2007). In Pakistan, the rents associated with preferential 
lending to companies with political connections are estimated to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) every year (Khwaja / Mian 2005).  
A considerable amount of theoretical literature in political science and economics has been 
produced in studying the underlying causes of corruption (Becker / Stigler 1974; Besley 
2006; Shleifer / Vishny 1993; Tullock 1980). These studies employ agency models as well 
as a cost-benefit analysis to explain the mechanism behind corruption and rent-seeking. 
Becker / Stigler (1974) produced a seminal theory of corruption by applying the principal-
agent model. The model examines the relationship between the principal (citizens) and the 
agent (public official), a potential violator, who takes bribes from private citizens seeking 
to obtain a government good. Their key insight is that high wages coupled with a non-zero 
probability of discovery will induce public officials to behave honestly. This would solve 
both problems of moral hazard, which arises from a lack of monitoring, and adverse 
selection, which stems from the inability to identify honest from dishonest agents. Beyond 
thinking of corruption in the usual principal-agent framework, some studies have explored 
the role of competition between corrupt agents (Rose-Ackerman 1978) and internal 
organisations, where bureaucrats violate the task assigned to them (Banerjee / Hanna / 
Mullainathan 2011).  
Many anti-corruption programmes exist – most rely on institutional strengthening through 
capacity building and the provision of equipment to improve efficiency. In the past few 
years, new strategies such as increasing citizens’ political awareness, enhancing trans-
parency through media, and citizen-led monitoring have also entered the current policy 
debate.  
Empirically, there are important challenges that still need to be addressed in the study of 
corruption. The first is the inherent difficulty in its measurement. Corruption is by nature a 
transaction that is illicit, covert and socially objectionable. Therefore, actors involved in 
corruption are unwilling to disclose their knowledge or participation. Moreover, 
corruption cross-country indices are normally based on respondents’ perceptions and 
expert opinions with diverging views on corrupt practices. Lastly, corruption estimates can 
be underreported if agents adjust their behaviour while there is an anti-corruption 
intervention in place (Banerjee / Hanna / Mullainathan 2011).   
The second challenge is establishing causation by linking anti-corruption strategies to 
development outcomes. For instance, past research has documented the role of press 
freedom in eliminating corruption, but the analysis is made difficult by the fact that access 
to information depends on other institutional factors that also explain the level of 
corruption. If governments determine the level of media exposure, are changes in 
corruption the result of press freedom or bureaucratic standards? Further, cross-national 
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statistics taken from the Press Freedom World Wide Index and corruption indices only 
suggest correlation, but do not provide strong evidence of causal links.  
4.1 Evaluation studies 
Anti-corruption strategies seek to reduce corruption and improve service delivery. If the 
aim of these strategies is to simply reduce corruption, then one could design a contract for 
a bureaucrat such that it eliminates corrupt activities. However, such a transaction may not 
actually cause an improvement in welfare. Banerjee / Hanna / Mullainathan (2011) 
illustrate this with an example in hospitals. Supposing, there are free hospitals beds for the 
poor. If demand for beds were to exceed supply, the situation would become a breeding 
ground for corruption, because bureaucrats may allocate beds to those who are willing to 
pay more. Thus there is a chance that the beds are allocated not to the people who are 
intended to benefit from them. One way to reduce corruption, according to the researchers, 
is through audits, or penalties for improper allocation. A much easier way would be for the 
government to “sell the beds to the bureaucrat and allow him to set any prices he wishes” 
(ibid., 2). Selling the beds to the bureaucrat will reduce corruption but it will not solve the 
allocation problem – that the beds are intended for the poor. Hence, anti-corruption 
strategies should ensure that not only corruption is reduced, but also that the overall 
welfare of the intended beneficiaries is not adversely affected. Another lesson is that 
although corruption may be reduced in one area, it can create distortions in another, or be 
channelled into a different form.   
Evaluations of anti-corruption strategies seek to establish the causal link between these 
strategies and the reduction or increase of corrupt practices. In many cases, these 
evaluations have also pioneered measurement by using more objective measures of 
corruption based on independent sources, official records or surveys (see Olken 2007; 
Reinikka / Svensson 2004).  
Four main types of anti-corruption interventions are identified in this paper (see Table 3). 
These interventions are (i) audits, (ii) monitoring, (iii) information campaigns and (iv) an 
increase in salaries for public officials. These interventions seek to deter corrupt behaviour 
by exposing corrupt practices, changing the incentives for corrupt behaviour and creating 
public awareness so that public officials can be held accountable. The strategies outlined 
below have been widely advocated by donors in the past, but evaluation has mostly taken 
the form of desk reviews, field visits or anecdotal evidence. The available micro-empirical 
evidence, however, shows some intriguing results, as will be revealed below. 
Audits 
There are controversies regarding the effectiveness of audits as an anti-corruption strategy: 
Governments have greater competence in countering police corruption, because as an 
insider they have more information. They have the ability to detect fraud from within and 
understand complex rules and regulations. However, auditors in many developing 
countries are poorly paid, lack independence and do not have the necessary expertise to 
detect and sanction illicit behaviour. Regarding internal auditing, the argument has been 
brought forward that the person or office that is supposed to conduct the audit may also be 
corrupt.  
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Results from evaluation studies suggest otherwise. A strong audit helps rein in corruption. 
In the context of road projects in Indonesia, increasing the probability of top-down audits 
to 100 percent reduced ‘missing expenditures’ (Olken 2007). Francken / Minten / Swinnen 
(2009) also note that a top-down audit played a vital role in preventing the capture of 
educational funds in Madagascar. Di Tella / Schargrodsky (2003) find that offering higher 
wages to procurement officers in public hospitals in Buenos Aires can reduce corruption, 
if the level of audit intensity is medium.  
Monitoring 
Citizens have incentives to be vigilant and to monitor officials, because they are the direct 
beneficiaries of public services. However, monitoring public officials entails costs – effort, 
transaction costs and opportunity costs in the form of time invested. Since reduced 
corruption is a public good where everybody benefits regardless of their contribution, 
individuals have an incentive to free-ride. Where effort is driven by market forces, 
individuals bear the cost today in the hope that it will give them a competitive advantage 
tomorrow. If this is not the case, the optimal move is not to engage in monitoring at all. 
Whether or not citizen monitoring can work has been explored by the evaluation studies 
below. 
The findings from citizen enforcement through village ‘accountability’ meetings are 
mixed: These meetings take the form of a complaint and monitoring mechanism, where 
problems are discussed and brought to the attention of the appropriate public officials. 
While some researchers found community-based monitoring helpful in the context of 
primary health care in Uganda by making local health care providers accountable 
(Bjorkman / Svensson 2009), in the context of road projects in Indonesia, others found 
that it has little impact on reducing the capture of public funds (Olken 2007).  
Information campaigns 
In the traditional agency problem, the principals (the people) and the agents (the 
bureaucrats) have different interest structures. The agent may exert less effort, shirk from 
his/her responsibilities and partake in undue risks. To prevent this, the principal aims to 
hire good agents and to ensure that they deliver the services according to the contract. 
Because information is not perfect, the principal does not have prior knowledge regarding 
agent character (good or bad) and he/she cannot monitor the agent’s effort perfectly. In 
order to align the incentives of the agent and the principal, various compensation schemes 
are available, such as efficiency, profit sharing, output-based contracts, etc. The problem 
is that in many cases none of these schemes is applicable to a typical bureaucrat. Wages in 
developing countries tend to be far lower than in the private sector, profit cannot be shared 
and contracts are usually provided long-term regardless of performance.  
One of the plausible schemes whereby people can monitor bureaucrats is public disclosure 
of information. This intervention and its variants have received a lot of attention recently 
and is perhaps the most evaluated intervention, not only in the literature on corruption, but 
also for the governance sector more generally. Evaluation studies on this intervention 
show some promise. 
Innovations in governance 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 19 
Public disclosure of information through local media plays a significant role in reducing 
the capture of public funds. Media in the form of audit reports, scorecards, newspapers, 
local radio and television help to make governments and politicians accountable. 
Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2010) preliminary results in Uganda show that a scorecard 
that provides information about Parliament activities can be an effective political 
accountability mechanism. Also in Uganda, Reinikka / Svensson (2005) document the 
impact of a newspaper campaign in minimising the capture of school grants for local 
schools. However, Hubbard (2007) describes some scepticism over Reinikka and 
Svensson’s results. He argues that the government’s resolve to reduce leakage of funds 
should also be taken into account, rather than attributing the “huge” reduction in leakage 
only to the newspaper campaign. Francken / Minten / Swinnen (2009) suggest that media 
reduces capture of public funds in Madagascar, but that its impact depends on the local 
literacy rate. That is, if there is widespread illiteracy, local television and radio are more 
important as an anti-corruption instrument than newspaper and poster campaigns.  
The results from audits, monitoring and information interventions are consistent with the 
systematic review conducted by Hanna et al. (2011). Of the 14 studies included in their 
analysis, they found that monitoring and incentive mechanisms have the potential to 
reduce corruption in the short run. Furthermore, according to their result, decentralisation 
also has the potential to reduce corruption, but its longer-term effect remains to be seen. A 
3ie briefing paper points to both information and voter mobilisation campaigns as 
successful examples of anti-corruption interventions (Mishra / Menon 2011).  
Increased salaries for public officials 
This is one of the most common anti-corruption policies that donors and governments 
repeatedly endorse in developing countries, a policy recommendation that goes back to the 
results of Becker / Stigler (1974). To date, there appears to be only one completed quasi-
experiment by Di Tella / Schargrodsky (2003) and one ongoing RCT from JPAL that 
addresses the impact of bureaucrats’ salaries on corruption6.  
Di Tella / Schargrodsky (2003) support Becker and Stigler’s theory by exploiting an 
exogenous audit probability in the public hospitals in Buenos Aires. They find that 
increasing public officials’ salaries can only be effective if used in conjunction with 
auditing. This finding is related to the theoretical framework discussed by Besley / 
McLaren (1993) in the context of tax collection. They emphasise that increasing wages 
would only be effective if there is strong monitoring and if there is a high number of 
dishonest agents.  
It would be interesting to test empirically the sole effect of higher salaries and the 
combined effect of higher salaries and surveillance. Khan / Khwaja / Olken (2012) are 
currently working on such an evaluation. They are looking at the impact of a salary 
increase, with and without auditing, on the behaviour of tax inspectors in the Punjab, 
Pakistan. The evaluation is ongoing and no results are available yet. However, apart from 
conducting studies of internal revenue systems or tax collectors, other promising 
                                                 
6  The relationship between corruption and the salaries of public officials has been studied using cross-
country regressions and has provided results that are ambiguous. See Svensson (2005); van 
Rijckeghem / Weder (1997); Rauch / Evans (2000) and Treisman (2000).  
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Table 3: Anti-corruption interventions 
Title Intervention Region/ 
Country 
Status Method Author / 
Source/Donor 
Monitoring corruption: 
Evidence from a field 
experiment in Indonesia 
Audit, 
village 
meetings, 
surveys 
Indonesia completed  RCT Olken (2007) / 
World Bank 
and DFID 
Electoral accountability and 
corruption: Evidence from the 
audits of local governments 
Audit Brazil completed  RCT Ferraz / Finan 
(2009)/3ie 
The returns from reducing 
corruption: Evidence from 
education in Uganda 
Audit Uganda completed  RCT Reinikka / 
Svensson 
(2007) 
The Power of information: 
Evidence from a newspaper 
campaign to reduce capture 
Information 
campaign 
Uganda completed RCT, 
IV 
Reinikka / 
Svensson 
(2004) 
Power to the people: Evidence 
from a randomised field 
experiment of community-
based monitoring in Uganda 
Village 
meetings 
Uganda completed RCT Björkman / 
Svensson 
(2009) / 
SIDA and 
World Bank 
Curbing corruption through 
social welfare reform? The 
effects of Mexico's conditional 
cash transfer programme on 
good governance 
CCT Mexico completed RCT  Grimes / 
Wängnerud 
(2010) 
Obtaining a driver's license in 
India: An experimental 
approach to studying corruption 
Financial 
bonus, 
driving 
lessons 
India completed RCT Bertrand et al. 
(2007) 
Information for accountability, 
citizens' report cards - Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (I) 
Report cards Rwanda ongoing  RCT World Bank 
(DIME) 
Property tax experiment in the 
Punjab, Pakistan: Testing the 
role of wages, incentives and 
audits on tax inspectors’ 
behaviour 
Salary in-
crease and 
audits 
Pakistan ongoing RCT Khan / Khwaja / 
Olken (2012) 
Policing politicians: Citizen 
empowerment and political 
accountability in Uganda 
Score cards Uganda ongoing  RCT Humphreys / 
Weinstein 
(2010) 
The role of salaries and 
auditing during a crackdown on 
corruption in Buenos Aires 
Audit Argentina completed Non-
expe-
riment 
Di Tella / 
Schargrodsky 
(2003) 
Media, monitoring and the 
capture of public funds: 
Evidence from Madagascar 
Audits and 
media 
Madagas-
car 
completed Non-
expe-
riment 
Francken / 
Minten / 
Swinnen 
(2009) 
Source:  Author’s representation 
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areas where higher salaries and intensive monitoring might be useful in a developing 
country context are in the public transportation sector (e.g. license allocation for privatised 
buses) and traffic enforcement (e.g. citizens offering bribes or policemen accepting/ 
requesting bribes).  
Punishment or reward? 
In reality, governments pursue a mix of strategies in curbing corruption – punishment, 
reward or both. However, more work is needed to understand what determines the 
particular mix of strategies. The punishment scenario for example is one where (i) a public 
official is sanctioned if caught in the act of bribery or extortion; the reward scenario is one 
where (ii) a public official receives an award – monetary, ‘in kind’, or a recognition – for 
revealing corrupt practices or refusing to accept bribes; and the combination of the 
punishment and reward scenario is one where (iii) a public official is punished for not 
fulfilling certain pre-determined objectives, but receives an award if he does. To give a 
simple example, consider the Philippine Attrition Law of 2005, where revenue officials 
who fall short of their collection targets are removed from service, while good performers 
receive a monetary bonus. This policy is designed to reduce corruption by implicitly 
discouraging officials from overlooking tax evaders and to improve the incentives for 
good performance. Can punishment act as a substitute for incentives or would it destroy 
the intrinsic motivation to perform better?  
Studying the effectiveness of policies that directly punish misbehaving officials is of 
interest to governments, especially those that do not have the capacity to increase salaries 
across the board. Studies that focus on the role of punishment have been limited to a 
laboratory setting with students acting as the subjects of experiments (see Abbink / 
Ihrenbusch / Renner (2002); Schulze / Frank (2003); Schildberg-Hörisch / Strassmair 
(2010) for related literature). While lab experiments reduce many methodological 
problems compared to field data, in most cases they do not often mirror real life corruption 
scenarios. Lab experiments, however, do not have ethical issues to contend with.    
Box 3: Impact on combating corruption 
Intervention Combating corruption 
Community monitoring mixed 
Information campaigns positive 
Social cash transfer positive 
Salary increase positive if used in conjunction with auditing 
Source:  Author’s representation 
There is still much to be done in building consensus and in prescribing the best way to 
reduce corruption. Other important areas for evaluation could include analysing the effect 
of financial support to legal and financial institutions, interventions that address political 
nepotism, extortion and graft. Apart from these issues, it could also be interesting to study 
the subtle types of corruption that often occur in public office. For example, public 
officials may abuse power (i) by increasing official travel, encouraged by the receipt of 
per diems and greater opportunities to travel abroad, or (ii) by creating ghost projects and 
payrolls.  
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The micro evidence provided by this quantitative research– both through experimentation 
or other quantitative methods – partly confirms that corruption can be objectively 
measured, that causality can be clearly established and that central auditing and 
information campaigns as anti-corruption strategies have a potential to succeed under 
specific circumstances. However, despite the proliferation of anti-corruption strategies, 
evidence of their effectiveness remains scarce. Compared to the wide range of anti-
corruption strategies, a handful of impact evaluation studies on corruption, though very 
useful, may not be sufficient to provide programme managers and politicians with 
concrete policy prescriptions. They represent a narrow focus against the range of anti-
corruption interventions in developing countries. Hence, there is a great need of anti-
corruption research and impact evaluations.   
4.2 Empirical micro research 
Rather than focusing on combating corruption, some research studies seek to understand 
corruption – why it exists and through which channels it proliferates. The evaluations have 
mostly centred on incentives and their impact on corrupt practices. Some researchers have 
already moved beyond this point by emphasising the need to “map different mani-
festations of corruption to different underlying environments” (Bannerjee / Hanna / 
Mullainathan 2011).  
There are a number of micro-quantitative studies – experiments and quasi-experiments – 
that identify impediments to anti-corruption efforts and explain complex mechanisms to 
help us understand why and how corruption happens. These three examples will focus on 
the role of cultural norms, political connections and market distortions. 
Testing theories 
Fisman / Miguel (2007) believed that social norms and legal enforcements are important 
factors in explaining corruption. However, it is very difficult to “disentangle” the effects 
of one from the other, because “societies with weak anti-corruption social norms may 
simultaneously have less legal enforcement” (ibid., 1021). The stationing of thousands of 
diplomats from around the world in New York City can act as a natural experiment. These 
diplomats have diplomatic immunity, which means that though they may receive tickets 
for parking violations, they cannot be legally penalised for not paying the fines (zero legal 
enforcement). They come from different countries allowing the researchers to examine the 
specific role of cultural norms. Using parking violations of UN diplomats living in New 
York, they found that diplomats from high corruption countries tend to accumulate more 
parking violations than diplomats from low corruption countries. Furthermore, legal 
punishment appears to be effective in curbing corruption since parking violations by 
diplomats substantially dropped with the enforcement of the Clinton-Schumer Amend-
ment. It allows towing diplomatic cars, revoking the offender’s UN parking permits and a 
deduction in the US government aid given to the offender’s country.  
Olken / Barron (2009) examine the price differentials of bribes and extortion money paid 
by truck drivers to police and soldiers in Aceh. The researchers accompanied Indonesian 
truck drivers and have witnessed 6,000 illegal payments. Since surveys on trucks cannot 
be conducted randomly given that the behaviour of the police will change once they knew 
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about the research, Olken and Barron utilised the exogenous change in the number of 
checkpoints after the withdrawal of the military as part of a peace agreement with the local 
rebel group. They find that the reduction in checkpoints increased the amount of bribes 
paid by truck drivers, which is consistent with traditional pricing theories (inverse re-
lationship between price and quantity). They find that corrupt officials impose complex 
pricing schemes and that market structure plays an important role. Specifically, a higher 
bribe is charged (i) if there is high willingness to pay, (ii) if there are fewer checkpoints 
and (iii) if the point of collection is closest to the driver’s destination.  
Measurement 
As another example, Fisman (2001) studied the role of political connectedness on the 
share price of companies in Indonesia. Their analysis was based on some claims that 
especially in Southeast Asia a company’s value does not depend on productivity, but 
rather on how politically connected it is. But verifying these claims empirically is very 
difficult: The first problem is how to capture political connectedness – which means 
knowing all of the company’s political associations at various government levels as well 
as knowing the value of such connections to the company; the second problem is the 
sensitivity of the topic. While gathering data, political connections cannot be easily 
discussed within companies and among public officials. To be able to understand the 
impact of political connections, Fisman looked at the relationship between negative 
rumours regarding Suharto’s health and the profitability of politically dependent 
companies– those associated with Suharto’s children or allies. His findings suggest that 
politically dependent companies suffered more when the financial market was hit by 
Suharto’s failing health.  
In sum, the examples presented above suggest that anti-corruption efforts may not work, 
not because the intervention is flawed, but rather due to differences in local conditions and 
context, social norms, politics and market structure. Research on mechanisms plays an 
important role and provides surprising avenues in explaining corruption. 
5 Multidimensional peacekeeping 
Civil wars have accounted for 16.2 million deaths in 73 countries since 1945 (Fearon / 
Laitin 2003). Research suggests that these conflicts resulted in destruction of lives and 
properties, displacement, social exclusion and trauma. The microeconomic literature finds 
a growing negative impact of war. In Uganda, forced adolescent rebel recruits tend to be 
less well-educated, which negatively affects their wages or salaries as adults (Blattman / 
Annan 2010a). In Burundi and Zimbabwe, children who lived in areas affected by war 
display a lower height-for-age (Alderman / Hoddinott / Kinsey 2006; Bundervoet / 
Verwimp / Akresh 2009). But apart from showing the negative consequences of war, these 
types of studies help shed light to the extent and persistence of its effect, identify its 
victims and the cost associated with its occurrence (Blattman 2010).  
Donor programmes should adapt according to the adverse impact of wars on the target 
population. Nowadays, there is a grey line dividing peacekeeping and peace building 
efforts. Multidimensional peacekeeping (MP) integrates many of the non-military peace 
building efforts, very similar to post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Indeed, some of its 
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non-military aspects include interventions that seek to demobilise and reintegrate ex-rebel 
combatants. But the interventions do not stop there. Building on the arguments regarding 
the causes and consequences of civil war, elements of MP also include efforts that aim to 
revitalise the economy and encourage civic participation in public affairs.   
But do these efforts actually work as intended? Identifying the effects of multidimensional 
peacekeeping is difficult at the macro level, given many intervening forces, not to mention 
complementary development programmes in the country under consideration (Humphreys / 
Weinstein 2007). Anecdotal evidence shows that peacekeeping efforts that claim a 
positive effect at the macro level do not necessarily reflect success at the micro level. For 
instance, the experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti shows that 
despite improvements in the overall security conditions in the country, there are still deep 
pockets of violence at the local level and “in some cases the situation even worsened than 
before the arrival of peacekeepers” (Mvukiyehe / Samii 2010). 
There are four key challenges in evaluating MP programmes. The first one is the inherent 
complexity of the intervention. These programmes cover a wide range of issues, hence 
demonstrating their efficacy can be challenging if the interventions are not carefully 
documented and if there is huge variation in implementation. The second challenge is data 
collection in highly volatile situations, and more seriously, the challenge of obtaining 
control group data. MP programmes are characterised as “emergency” interventions at the 
height of conflicts or civil wars – meaning that assistance will be universal in nature and 
the possibility of conducting random assignment is very small. Similarly, the possibility of 
conducting quasi-experiments hinges on the availability of control group data that might 
not be available in the first place. The third challenge is spillover effects – that is 
programme benefits that trickle over to control groups. If, for example, nonparticipants 
benefited from the programme, and their incomes increased due to unintended 
circumstances, then the difference in incomes between treatment and control group may 
not be as large as it would otherwise be. Impact would then be underestimated. Spillovers 
are especially problematic from an analytical standpoint because of high levels of 
migration and displacements during conflicts and civil wars. People tend to move from 
one place to another when faced with security threats. If that is the case, programme 
beneficiaries in treatment community X may become part of non-programme beneficiaries 
in control community Y unless intensive monitoring is in place (which can be very costly) 
that can account for such mobility. And lastly, as in the strategies for administrative 
corruption and electoral accountability, analysing the impact of MP programmes suffers 
from self-selection and measurement.   
5.1 Evaluation studies 
Evaluation studies look at various components of multidimensional peacekeeping 
programmes at the micro level. Because rigorous quantitative evidence in this area 
remains sketchy, this paper broadly looks into projects and studies conducted in conflict 
and post-conflict settings within the framework of peacekeeping, peace building, state-
building or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) – see table 4.  
There are ongoing efforts to review evaluation studies on multidimensional peacekeeping. 
Specifically, Samii / Brown (2012) presented a comprehensive review of impact evalu-
ations stabilisation interventions where experiments and the quasi-experimental approach 
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had been used in the analysis. Grävingholt / Leiniger / von Haldenwang (2012) review 
state-building evaluations and research studies, and provides key lessons based on in-
depth country case studies. 
 
Table 4:  Multidimensional peacekeeping 
Title Intervention Country Status Method Author/Source 
/Donor 
Staff Recruitment and 
Retention in post-Conflict 
Uganda 
Work 
incentives 
Uganda ongoing RCT Lubanga / 
Ssewanyanya / 
Muwonge 
(2012a) 
Reducing Intergroup prejudice 
and Conflict using the Media: 
A field experiment in Rwanda 
Radio soap 
opera 
Rwanda completed RCT Paluck (2009) 
Information radio in southern 
Sudan 
Media Sudan ongoing RCT Paluck / Blair / 
Vexler (2012) 
Community-Based 
Reintegration in Aceh: 
Assessing the impacts of 
BRA-KDP  
Reintegration 
& assistance 
to conflict-
affected 
groups 
Indonesia completed PSM Barron et al. 
(2009) 
Donor: World 
Bank 
The Subtle Micro-Effects of 
Peacekeeping: Evidence from 
Liberia 
Peacekeeping 
mission 
Liberia completed Matching Mvukiyehe / 
Samii (2010) 
Reintegrating Rebels into 
Civilian Life: Quasi-
experimental evidence from 
Burundi  
 
 
Reintegration 
programme 
Burundi completed Matching Gilligan / 
Mvukiyehe / 
Samii (2012) 
 
Donor: Folke 
Bernadotte 
Academy, 
Sweden and 
United States 
Institute of 
Peace 
Peace from the Bottom Up: A 
randomised trial with UN 
peacekeepers 
Village 
security 
committees, 
education 
Liberia & 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
ongoing RCT Mvukiyehe / 
Samii (2011) 
Deference, Dissent and Dis-
pute Resolution: An experi-
mental intervention using 
mass media to change norms 
and behaviours in Rwanda 
Media Rwanda completed RCT Paluck / Green 
(2009) 
Community‐Driven 
Reconstruction in the 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Baseline report) 
Village 
governance 
committees 
DRC ongoing RCT Humphreys 
(2008)  
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continue table 4:  Multidimensional peacekeeping 
Peace in the Eyes of Israeli 
and Palestinian youths: Effects 
of collective narratives and 
peace education programmes 
Education Israel/ 
Palestine 
completed DID Biton / 
Solomon 
(2006) 
Can we Teach Peace and 
Conflict Resolution? Results 
from a randomised evaluation 
of the Community  
Empowerment Programme in 
Liberia: A programme to build 
peace, human rights and civic 
participation 
Education, 
dialogues, 
community 
mobilisation 
Liberia completed RCT Blattman / 
Hartman / 
Blair (2011)  
Reintegrating and Employing 
High Risk Youth in Liberia: 
Lessons from a randomised 
evaluation of a Landmine 
Action and agricultural 
training programme for ex-
combatants 
Education, 
training 
programmes 
Liberia completed RCT Blattman / 
Annan (2010) 
Employment Generation in 
Rural Africa: Mid-term results 
from an experimental 
evaluation of  
the Youth Opportunities 
Programmein northern 
Uganda 
Cash transfer 
to pay for 
tuition fees 
and materials 
for crafts 
Uganda Midterm 
completed. 
Long-term 
results in 
2012 
RCT Blattman / 
Fiala / 
Martinez 
(2011) 
Enterprises for ultra-Poor 
Women after War - the 
Women’s Income Generating 
Support (WINGS) programme 
Small grants  Uganda ongoing RCT Annan et al. 
(2012) 
Randomised Impact 
Evaluation of Phase II of 
Afghanistan’s National 
Solidarity Programme: 
Estimates of interim 
programme impact from first 
follow-up survey 
Grants and 
creation of 
community 
development 
councils 
Afghani-
stan 
ongoing RCT Beath et al. 
(2010) 
Long-term Effects of Peace 
Workshops in Protracted 
Conflicts 
Peace 
workshop 
Sri Lanka completed  Malhotra / 
Linayage 
(2005) 
Can Development Aid 
Contribute to Social Cohesion 
after Civil War? Evidence 
from a field experiment in 
post-conflict Liberia 
Community 
development 
committee 
Liberia completed RCT Fearon / 
Humphreys / 
Weinstein 
(2009) / DFID 
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The evaluation studies seek to resolve some of the challenges in evaluating MP pro-
grammes. With regard to complex interventions, most studies looked only at particular 
components of the programme at the micro level. The advantage of this approach is that it 
allows policymakers to know which component of the programme works and which does 
not. The disadvantage of course is the lack of information regarding the interaction of 
these components. There are cases where some projects have used a factorial design, 
allowing for a mixture of interventions and hierarchical designs, thus permitting an 
analysis for major and minor interventions (Biton / Solomon 2006 / Mvukiyehe / Samii 
2011). Data collection in volatile regions is always problematic. But as some of these 
evaluations show, great efforts from the international community are underway in 
producing good quality data for rigorous analysis, which has never been possible before. 
There are completed and ongoing evaluations for countries with volatile conditions such 
as Afghanistan, northern Liberia, the DRC and Burundi, to name a few. Spillover may be 
difficult to control especially if the treatment is assigned ex-ante in a non-random way. In 
most cases, spillover cannot be fully eliminated, but can somehow be minimised or tested 
for: One can either ensure that treatment and control groups are geographically far apart, 
or one can also test ex-post the extent to which spillover has affected the analysis. It can 
be the case that civil wars or violent conflicts have devastated so much of the transport 
infrastructure that people are constrained from moving freely; hence assuring that the 
effect of spillover is minimal.   
Education and training programmes 
These are dialogues and education programmes that intend to encourage peace, resolve 
conflicts and reduce security threats by appealing to the improved behaviour of the 
beneficiaries. In some cases the interventions are a mixture of training and monetary 
incentives that build on human capital to improve the livelihoods of the people affected by 
conflict and to help them become productive members of society. In many cases, they also 
aim to change the norms and behaviour of rebels, children and adult members of the 
community, in order to improve social cohesion by drawing out conflicting narratives, and 
develop empathy for both sides.  
continue table 4: Multidimensional peacekeeping 
Reshaping Institutions: 
Evidence on external aid and 
local collective action 
 
 
Community 
development 
committee, 
grants, 
facilitation 
Sierra 
Leone 
completed RCT Casey / 
Glennerster / 
Miguel (2011)  
 
Donors: 
GoBifo 
Project, 
IRCBP, World 
Bank 
Development 
Impact 
Evaluation 
(DIME) 
Initiative, etc. 
Source:  Author’s representation 
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A previous review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of training and peace 
education programmes shows that there are very few studies that were carried out in the 
context of actual conflict where randomisation or quasi-experiments had been utilised 
(Salomon 2004; 2006). Due to the nature of these efforts, previous studies have not 
sufficiently dealt with the problem of self-selection. For example, some ex-rebel 
combatants may choose to enrol in the programme, others may not. Those who 
participated in the programme may be systematically different from those who did not. 
Hence, it will be difficult to infer that the estimated impact has been due to the programme 
if those who participated in the programme were initially better (or worse). These studies 
do not provide definitive answers regarding the effects of programmes. Recent evaluation 
studies offer new insights on the effectiveness of education and training programmes in 
the context of peace building. 
Biton / Solomon (2006) find that a one-year peace education programme among Israeli 
and Palestinian students aged 15 to 16 years old has significantly changed their views 
about peace. Rather than viewing peace as the “absence of violence”, programme 
participants perceived peace as a “positive entity” linked to co-operation and friendship, 
and are less likely to support “war”. Furthermore, a brief but intensive peace workshop 
appears to also have a positive impact. Malhotra / Liyanage (2005) evaluated the impact of 
a four-day intergroup “contact intervention” between Tamil and Sinhalese students in Sri 
Lanka one year after the programme and found that participants have more empathy 
towards members of the other ethnic group than nonparticipants, and the participants have 
also donated more money to poor children of the other ethnicity.  
An agricultural training programme for ex-combatants and high risk youths in Liberia, 
known as Action on Armed Violence, shows that participants of the programme have an 
increased likelihood of engaging in agricultural activity as a source of income and spend 
less time involved in illicit activities, although the rate of participation in these activities 
remains the same (Blattman / Annan 2010b). The study found out, however, that the 
programme did not increase income in the short term and demonstrated small 
improvements on social integration.  
Still in Liberia, Blattman / Hartman / Blair (2011b) studied the impact of the Community 
Empowerment Program, which is one of the largest peace building programmes in the 
country that mainly seeks to assess the impact of education campaigns on community and 
individual participation, attitudes to human rights and patterns of conflict. The result 
shows that the programme had little impact on participation and only contributed modestly 
to attitudinal changes towards equity and human rights, but it played a significant role in 
conflict resolution.  
In many emergency and reintegration programmes, randomisation or programme roll-out 
are not feasible. In Burundi, Gilligan / Mvukiyehe / Samii (2012) exploited the delay in 
programme implementation due to contractual disputes to obtain a control group 
comparison. The incentive package allows adult ex-rebel combatants to choose from the 
following: a secondary or university education, a vocational training programme or 
“nonfinancial start-up materials to begin income-generating activities” (ibid., 13). 
Because the programme was not randomly assigned to ex-combatants, the authors 
matched the characteristics of ex-combatants who received the package to those who have 
been affected by the delay. They found that the package increased livelihood income, but 
not political integration. But because the data were gathered only nine months after receipt 
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of the package, a longer-term evaluation may come to a different result– one would 
imagine that political integration is a slow process that takes time to mature. 
Institution-building at the local level 
At the core of community-driven reconstruction programmes7 (CDR) is the establishment 
of local development committees in post-conflict communities. The idea is that these 
committees, formed by electing leaders, should pave the way for social reconciliation, 
more co-operation and inclusiveness in the local decision-making process. Can 
community-driven reconstruction programmes promoted by external donors improve well-
being and create lasting peace?     
Community-driven reconstruction programmes8 show short-term promise in building 
social cohesion and aiding the provision of public goods. Fearon / Humphreys / Weinstein 
(2009) tested the impact of a DFID funded CDR programme on social co-operation in 
northern Liberia. To avoid survey desirability bias, the authors conducted a public goods 
game, where participants were provided cash and were asked to choose, anonymously, the 
amount they will retain for themselves and the amount they will contribute to the 
community. The authors find that exposure to CDR programmes increased the 
individuals’ contribution to a public good, compared to individuals who were not exposed 
to the programme. Similarly, Casey / Glennerster / Miguel (2011) find that a community-
driven development programme in post-conflict Sierra Leone increased “the stock of local 
public goods, but did not lead to any lasting changes in village institutions, local 
collective action capacity, social norms and attitudes, or the nature of de facto political 
power” (ibid., 32).  
Preliminary findings from the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan show that 
the creation of community development councils and the selection of projects shows 
intermediate improvements in (i) village governance where decision-making is transferred 
from village elders to the councils, (ii) citizens’ attitude towards government officials and 
(iii) citizens’ assessment of their economic well-being (Beath / Christia / Kabuli 2010). 
There are two other ongoing evaluations, one is a CDR programme in eastern Congo 
(Humphreys 2008), and the other in Liberia. The Liberian evaluation employed a special 
type of intervention, much more suited to peacekeeping. Their main intervention creates 
village committees to improve communication on security-related issues between the local 
communities and peacekeeping missions. Some of their outcomes of interest include 
security, local governance, collective action and civic participation.  
Social cash transfers 
Cash transfer programmes within the multidimensional peacekeeping framework mainly 
seek to improve (i) economic well-being and (ii) social co-operation. Opportunities to 
work and make a living can be a challenge in the aftermath of violent conflicts or civil 
wars. To discourage re-recruitment into rebel groups and to enhance reintegration into 
civilian life, cash transfer programmes aim to eliminate credit constraints among the 
                                                 
7  Also Community-Driven Development (CDD) programs in post-conflict areas. 
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affected by providing regular cash payments to small groups or to vulnerable members of 
the community. In so doing, it can provide means to start a business, improve livelihoods 
and establish a good working relationship within the community. Due to the paucity of 
empirical evidence on the impact of cash transfers in post-conflict situations, solid 
conclusions are at this stage difficult to come to. However, some evaluation studies are 
underway to provide some answers. 
Cash transfer programmes seem to have a robust impact on livelihood or personal well-
being, but a weak effect on social cohesion. Blattman / Fiala / Martinez (2011) evaluated 
the impact of the Youth Opportunities Program (YOP) in northern Uganda, which 
provides unconditional cash transfers to groups of young men and women to start a 
business, aimed at increasing incomes and improving community reconciliation. By 
design, the cash is transferred to groups without or with very little monitoring after 
disbursement. The researchers find evidence of increased levels of investment, increased 
social cohesion and a reduction in aggressive behaviour (at least among men). Focusing on 
highly vulnerable women, Annan et al. (2012) examine the impact of a small grant transfer 
coupled with intensive monitoring and training in northern Uganda.  
In Aceh, Indonesia, Barron et al. (2009) evaluated the impact of Community-based 
Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims, a programme that is financially supported 
by the Government of Indonesia and the World Bank. The programme provides block 
grant assistance to communities who deliberate on how the funds will be spent. While the 
programme reported improved perceptions on well-being, it has an imperceptible effect on 
social cohesion or in terms of improved citizen-state relations. As with many programmes 
where members of the communities were offered a choice on how to spend the funds, the 
impact may be confounded by factors related to the decision-making process that took 
place. That is, it is unclear whether the outcomes are the result of the programme alone, or 
of the way the community arrived at their choice (for example, discussions that were 
highly participatory may induce more co-operation and ownership in participants, hence 
better outcomes than discussions that were authoritative).  
Peacekeeping mission 
One of the motivations behind peacekeeping deployments is the creation of a “security 
bubble”: citizens should feel more secure in areas where there are peacekeeping operations 
(Mvukiyehe / Samii 2010). Because citizens feel secure, this should stimulate economic 
investments and social activities.    
Mvukiyehe / Samii (2010) studied the effects of United Nations peacekeeping bases on 
security and economic outcomes in Liberia. The United Nations Missions in Liberia is 
tasked to support the peace process and to revitalise the economic and social 
infrastructures. Their preliminary results proved to be contrary to the security bubble 
hypothesis. They find that fear and the experience of victimisation, and in-migration rate 
are higher in communities where there are no UN bases, consistent with the security 
bubble hypothesis. Despite surprising negative impact on social participation in base 
communities, the good news is that base communities exhibit a vibrant labour market and 
demonstrate higher incomes.  
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Media and information campaigns 
As a traditional marketing technique, the media has been used to raise awareness and to 
ultimately change the behaviour and attitude of the target audience. Examples of such 
campaigns in conflict and post-conflict scenarios are mass media, newspapers, posters or 
billboard announcements, soap operas, SMS text messaging and internet campaigns. The 
main advantage of using mass media under conflict environments is that it is typically 
easier to administer and can be relatively cheaper than other interventions. The problem, 
however, is the need to ensure that there is a working communications infrastructure to 
support such an endeavour. Furthermore the content and the modes of delivery should be 
carefully designed to avoid unintended messages.  
“For example, in the DRC, a billboard campaign featured graphic pictures of 
gangs and men and their victims either just before or just after rape. The 
words on the billboards typically said, “Stop Rape” but the image 
communicates the idea that “Rape is common. This happens in our 
community. This is normal.”(Paluck / Ball 2010, 42) 
In their research in Rwanda, Paluck (2007; 2009) and Paluck / Green (2009) showed 
evidence that a radio soap opera played for one year has improved social cooperation, 
trauma healing, empathy, trust, and participant’s expression of dissent (rather than being 
blind followers). Despite these changes, the researchers claim that the radio programme 
did not change much the personal beliefs of the listeners. Before broadcasting the 
reconciliation programme, 14 communities consisting of 40 randomly selected partici-
pants have been identified to be part of the evaluation. Participants in the treatment 
communities listened to a reconciliation radio programme and participants in the control 
communities listened to a health radio programme. The assignment of programme was 
random. To ensure that the participants did indeed listen to the programme, Rwandan 
research assistants came to the communities with their portable radios to have the 
programme heard in the communities’ gathering area. Then they took note of attendance 
and discussions after the participants have left. The problem with their approach is that it 
is possible that some participants in the control communities have also listened to the 
reconciliation programme. The researchers tried avoiding this problem by providing 
incentives for not listening to the programme: participants in the control groups were 
promised to be given a portable stereo and 14 cassette tapes of all reconciliation episodes 
at the end of the study. There is also ongoing related work on these issues in southern 
Sudan (Paluck / Blair / Vexler 2012).  
Staff recruitment 
The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) is currently funding an ongoing 
three-year evaluation of a staff recruitment programme being implemented by the 
Ugandan government. In conflict and post-conflict areas, the delivery of public services is 
almost non-existent at the local level. One part of the reason for this is that employees in 
key government posts tend to resign or transfer to another area. To boost staff recruitment 
and retention in health care and education institutions, the government offers a “special 
incentive package” to encourage government employees to relocate to conflict-afflicted 
areas in northern Uganda (Lubanga / Ssewanyanya / Muwonge 2012b).  
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The selected evaluations on multidimensional peacekeeping provide us with three key 
lessons. First, there are a number of evaluations that provide results that are quite 
unexpected – either because these results challenge our previous formal theoretical 
assumptions, or because these results confront the conventional logic on which we have 
based our programming. Similarly problematic, there are cases where the underlying logic 
that underpins intervention-outcome relationship is not explicit – that is, there are various 
competing theories in the literature and no priors are available for empirical prediction. 
Second, although there is a tacit consensus that in fragile environments the observed short-
term impact can differ substantially in the long-run, there is a clear message that we do not 
know much about the long-term effects – what type of outcomes we are likely to observe, 
how these outcomes came about, and so forth. Third, despite security threats and logistical 
difficulties, the increasing number of evaluations in this field conveys the impression that 
there are researchers who have managed to conduct quantitative evaluations in very 
challenging environments. Besides facilitating the collection of better data, this can impart 
critical lessons about peacekeeping and state-building interventions.  
5.2 Empirical micro research 
The evaluation studies discussed focus on the impact of multidimensional peacekeeping 
on living conditions and social cohesion in the aftermath of a conflict or civil war. It does 
not provide programme managers, diplomats and politicians with information on how to 
prevent future violent conflict or how to resolve ongoing civil wars.  
In the hope of addressing this need, some research studies attempt to answer the questions 
why people rebel, why conflict occurs and what its consequences are. In other words, what 
are the factors that increase the risk of rebellion? And what are the consequences of civil 
war?  Although researchers argue that the current studies on the causes of war will not 
help in resolving conflicts, nevertheless, it can be useful for conflict prevention and post-
conflict reconstruction.  
Cross-country studies on internal war find that past wars, poverty, poor growth and a large 
population are main factors for civil war (see Hoeffler 2011 for a short survey of the 
literature). However, these studies must be interpreted with caution: Most of these 
variables, such as poverty and growth are endogenous to civil war. Poverty causes civil 
wars, but civil wars destroy life and livelihoods. Hence the regressions should employ 
credible econometric methods to address causality.  
Box 4:  Impact on behavioural and economic outcomes 
Intervention Behavioural outcomes Economic (or institutional) 
outcomes 
Education and training programme positive impact on students, but 
weak effect on ex-combatants 
mixed 
Community-driven reconstruction positive on public goods 
contribution 
weak impact on institutions 
Social cash transfer weak positive 
Media positive  
Source:  Author’s representation 
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Some research studies below examine the causes of rebellion and civil wars with the use 
of experiments and micro-econometric techniques at the level of armed groups, 
communities and individuals. Analysis at this level would also help resolve many 
aggregation problems associated with macro level studies.    
Testing theories 
Why rebel? There are various competing theories on why civilians participate in armed 
conflict, naming material incentives, greed and grievances, geography and abduction as 
one of the crucial factors. Humphreys / Weinstein (2008) set out to test three theories 
using attitudes and behaviours of ex-combatants and non-combatants in the context of 
Sierra Leone’s civil war. They find that joining armed conflict is associated with an 
individual’s poverty, lack of education and the offer of private goods by the rebels. Their 
results suggest that theories on grievances, selective incentives and social sanctions 
coexist, contrary to traditional beliefs that they are rivals. In addition, their results show 
that involuntary participation such as abduction and coercion plays a crucial role in 
recruitment. This has been ignored in past debates.  
Testing causality 
Identifying the appropriate intervention also requires an understanding of how conflict 
affects the population. In other words, what are the consequences of war? For instance, 
Blattman (2009) and Blattman / Annan (2010a) studied the impact of child soldiering in 
Uganda. They find that the victims became psychologically resilient as a result of their 
experience, gained acceptance in their community and have become more politically 
active. However, their findings show that participation in conflict has negative 
consequences for their income and level of education. In Sierra Leone, Bellows / Miguel 
(2009) also find that individuals that directly experience war and violence become more 
engaged politically than non-victims. In contrast to the previous study, they do not observe 
a negative socioeconomic legacy two to three years after the war. These two studies used 
data gathered at the individual level and suggest that the mechanism between violence and 
social outcomes is inherent to the individual. Because of war, individuals participate more. 
Gilligan / Pasquale / Samii (2011) argues that the mechanism can also operate through the 
community. Their findings show that individuals in communities with higher exposure to 
civil war in Nepal exhibit greater trust and contribute more to a public good, than those 
individuals in unaffected communities. This is because communities affected by war must 
develop new norms and institutions to withstand violence. 
Studies on the consequences of civil wars and conflict can help to illuminate donor 
programming. In the Ugandan context, it is more crucial to provide assistance in education 
and livelihood than social reintegration, which is the focus of most current programmes 
(see also Annan et al. 2010). If conflict and civil war have had more of an impact on the 
economic and educational potential of ex-combatants, rather than their reintegration into 
society, then multidimensional peacekeeping programmes should react flexibly to this fact 
and attach more importance to economic or educational assistance. In Sierra Leone, the 
experience of war makes individuals more politically active, which casts doubt on 
programmes that aim to promote such behaviour, given that it is already endorsed by the 
citizens. The evidence from Nepal shows that community-based strategies and institution-
building should not be neglected in donor programming.  
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Understanding the consequences of armed conflict and violence within a country can help 
local programmers align their interventions towards what is actually needed by the target 
population, rather than purely relying on hunches, first impressions, or anecdotal evidence. 
Evaluation and research on causal mechanisms can provide hard evidence to inform the 
design of peacekeeping interventions.  
6 Some lessons 
Some lessons for the practice of governance can be extracted based on common patterns 
that emerged from the previous chapters: 
1. Issues on generalisability. Looking at the list of evaluations, it is too early to make any 
generalisations about which interventions work best. Most of the evaluations are from 
isolated and one-off interventions that highly are context-specific. Furthermore, most 
evaluations have very short-term horizons –that is, inter-temporal impacts have rarely 
been addressed.   
Some researchers advise the replication of similar evaluations in different contexts, 
while others promote testing interventions that have not yet undergone rigorous 
evaluation. Beyond understanding the trade-off between depth and breadth  
(replicating similar interventions in different setting versus testing new interventions), 
there still is disagreement about the ‘summative’ ability of impact evaluations and 
their usefulness for donors as an tool for accountability (Naudet / Delarue / Bernard 
2012).  
2. Improving donor coordination. Impact evaluation has flourished recently and that 
momentum must be maintained. However, this should be done in a more coordinated 
manner. Since some impact evaluation methods – especially RCT – require large in-
vestments, donors should coordinate to maximise the return from such evaluations. 
Part of this endeavour is to create or support a database of impact evaluations where 
ongoing and completed evaluations are logged and shared amongst each other and the 
public. Apart from showcasing the results of the evaluation, the database should pro-
vide information describing (i) the challenges in conducting the evaluation, (ii) the 
questions left unanswered and (iii) what evaluators should do to improve the execution 
of such evaluations in the future. In due course, this database should provide a founda-
tion for discussions among donors, specifically on the thematic gap and lessons 
learned.  
3. Engineer an iterative cycle of learning and adaptation. Donor agencies should have 
the capacity to absorb lessons learned from rigorous evaluations and to become more 
critical of traditionally-designed interventions (or getting rid of path-dependency). Do-
nors that view impact evaluations as a learning tool should adapt the results to their 
daily operations in the field and when designing new programmes. But because there 
are still relatively few rigorous evaluations, donors may have to undergo an iterative 
cycle of learning and adaptation. 
4. Strengthen local ownership. The evaluations reviewed in this paper were largely donor 
driven and most of the analytics were done in developed countries (mostly at US uni-
versities). Unfortunately, the role of researchers and universities in developing coun-
Innovations in governance 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 35 
tries is mostly limited to data collection9. To ensure country ownership and use of 
evaluations for policy-making, the international community has to a greater extent to 
involve local actors in the various aspects of the evaluation.   
5. Measurement as a key challenge. There clearly is a demand for more conceptualisation 
and construction of better indicators reflecting the outcome that we want to measure as 
closely as possible. Furthermore, there is a shortage of micro-databases to conduct in-
depth empirical work. There is great potential in integrating the data collection process 
between evaluation and research on mechanisms. In some cases, mechanism studies 
can be integrated with baseline data collection. This would ease important funding is-
sues, while at the same time deriving reliable information about the target population.  
6. Evaluate theories and systematically integrate them in donor programming. Apart 
from evaluations, donors should diversify their product mix, ranging from rigorous 
impact evaluations to research and mechanism studies. Results from the evaluation of 
theories are geared not only to academic researchers but also to donors, providing in-
formation about why the interventions work. Furthermore, the need to, whenever fea-
sible, employ rigorous quantitative methods to present evidence should be further em-
phasised.  
7 Integrating evaluation and research studies that test assumptions  
and validate mechanisms into donor programming: a two-pronged  
approach 
Donors vary in their approaches toward governance support. But they all have one serious 
problem: The problem of taking context into account when designing interventions 
(O'Neil / Foresti / Hudson 2007). There is to this day no unified strategy on how to go 
about this problem. Although it is widely acknowledged that incentives and constraints 
that shape the behaviour of the target population can be important factors in the success or 
failure of certain interventions, little attention in development policy has been paid to 
research studies and evaluations that test the assumptions behind an intervention.  
The two-pronged approach proposed in this paper means systematically combining both 
research and evaluation studies to inform policy. Why is there a need for both approaches? 
Evaluation provides information about the effectiveness of certain programmes and 
policies advocated by donors and governments in practice, but it is still weak in providing 
information about causes and consequences, as well as the underlying mechanisms that 
determine why outcomes occur or not, especially if it does not test for a different 
intervention and a different theory of change. With this in mind, information derived from 
testing both mechanism and intervention studies should “complement” each other in donor 
programming, rather than acting as “substitutes” (Ludwig / Kling / Mullainathan 2011).  
In a highly simplified framework, the current trend in donor programming, represented by 
the top arrow in Diagram 1, is to design and implement a programme once a problem is 
                                                 
9  From the start, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) had been pushing for more 
involvement of researchers from developing countries in evaluation. Further, last year, they established 
a new funding scheme, where the government agencies themselves identify the interventions they want 
evaluated, and researchers then propose an evaluation design.   
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perceived. Evaluation is then conducted to learn about the effect of the programme, to 
satisfy donor requirements and to inform policies.  
The problem with such an approach is that the perceived problems are often unverified – 
they can be based on anecdotal evidence or personal impressions. In many cases, 
feasibility studies are conducted before roll-out to confirm various claims. However, these 
studies are often not carried out systematically, or if they are, they lack the necessary 
empirical rigour.  
Conducting research to test theories and mechanisms using rigorous quantitative methods 
should be systematically incorporated in programming (horizontal arrows in the middle of 
Diagram 1). The idea is that once a perceived problem is identified, mechanism studies are 
conducted to (i) provide the causes/consequence of the problem or (ii) to test competing 
theories on the causality between intervention and outcome. The result should guide the 
design and implementation of the intervention. The effectiveness of the intervention is 
then examined through standard impact evaluation. Finally, results from both impact 
evaluation and research studies should be used for policymaking. In case the target 
population already exhibits the behaviour that the potential intervention aims to promote, 
the results can be used directly to make informed decisions (bottom arrow). 
Whenever feasible, donors should conduct research on theories and mechanisms that 
supports the causal chain. Although it might be more difficult to justify the financing of 
mechanism studies than conventional evaluation studies, there are various channels that 
can be considered to conduct them:  
• In case data is already available, use funds to conduct quantitative analysis. 
• In some cases, studies already exist in exactly the context programme managers need. 
In that case, programme managers only need to become aware of such work by com-
missioning a scoping study.  
• Alternatively, baseline studies coupled with appropriate quantitative analysis can also 
provide information about the most suitable intervention. The idea is not only to col-
lect data to monitor future outcomes, but also information on causes and consequenc-
es, and perhaps underlying mechanisms that can guide programming.   
Diagram 1: Integrating mechanism studies: a simplified framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s representation 
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• If no data is available, fund field surveys, providing the extraordinary opportunity to 
understand local conditions.  
8 Conclusion 
This paper presented recent evidence about the effectiveness of governance interventions 
in improving electoral participation, combating corruption and promoting peace and 
stability. Notwithstanding the paucity of evidence and the issues on generalisability that 
this raises, the outline found the following: On electoral accountability, international 
observers and the use of technology constrain vote manipulation; social cash transfer have 
a mixed effect on voter turnout and vote share; and civic information campaigns have a 
positive impact on electoral participation and the vote share of the incumbent, but the 
effect can vary depending on the campaign message. On administrative corruption, social 
cash transfer and information campaigns help to combat corruption. Increases in salaries 
can be effective if coupled with auditing, while results from community monitoring are 
mixed. With regard to multidimensional peacekeeping, peace education programmes have 
a positive impact on students, but a weak effect of ex-combatants; community-driven 
reconstruction programmes improve provision of public goods, but the effect on 
institution-building is weak. Social cash transfers have a strong effect on well-being, but a 
weak effect on social cohesion. Media in the form of soap operas are found to have 
positive impacts on many behavioural outcomes, except on personal beliefs.  
Although the evaluations provided important information on whether the programme or 
policies work or not, answering why they work remains a significant gap. It is also often 
neglected that sometimes a good counterfactual is not necessarily “no intervention”, but a 
different intervention that tests a different theory of change. Evaluating policies or 
programmes “cannot be automatically extrapolated outside the context in which they were 
obtained” (Deaton 2010, 449). What is needed is to also evaluate the theories and 
assumptions behind the intervention. Without the ability to address the why question, it is 
unlikely that donors can take the appropriate corrective action.  
This paper further explored the potential of combining evaluation studies and empirical 
micro research to explain the mechanism that impede selectoral participation, the channels 
of corruption and the incentives that encourage rebellion. The idea is to close the 
knowledge gap left open by evaluations of projects and policies at this point, and to 
identify avenues how both can be used to the benefit of programme managers. In sum, 
rigorous testing of both, projects and theories, can help make the most of policy-relevant 
information in the long-run. 
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